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United States

US Treaty Anti-Avoidance Rules: An Overview and Assessment

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah* and Oz Halabi**
*Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, the University of Michigan. The
author can be contacted at aviyonah@umich.edu.
**SJD Candidate, the University of Michigan. The author can be
contacted at ozh@umich.edu.

In this article, the authors provide a summary of the antiavoidance rules in the United States that relate to bilateral
tax treaties. Specifically, they focus on treaty-based antiavoidance rules and discuss whether or not a General AntiAvoidance Rule would be appropriate in this context. ok

1. Introduction

Anti-avoidance rules are a tool used to eliminate the abusive
behaviour of taxpayers seeking to reduce their tax burden on
business and investment transactions. A taxpayer should, can and
even must structure a transaction or a business to be associated
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with as few tax consequences as possible. However, when the only
or the primary reason for choosing the structure is tax
motivated it should be considered to be abusive behaviour and
ought to be countered by the legislator. One way to counter such
abusive behaviour is by enacting anti-avoidance rules.

There are several ways to put in place anti-avoidance rules and
there are several types of those rules. In general, antiavoidance rules may be divided into two main groups: (1) General
Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAARs); and (2) Specific Anti-Avoidance
Rules (SAARs). There are also several ways to enact and
implement anti-avoidance rules, i.e. by domestic legislation,
bilateral and multilateral agreements, court decisions, for
example, the European Court of Justice in the European Union, or
by the enforcement, interpretation and policy of domestic
authorities.

While SAARs are promulgated to counter a specific abusive
behaviour, GAARs are used to support SAARs and to cover
transactions that are not covered by SAARs. Accordingly, abusive
behaviour on the part of a taxpayer that might defeat a SAAR
either due to technicalities or sophisticated planning might
eventually be targeted and disallowed or recharacterized by a
GAAR. However, an essential prerequisite of characterizing
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taxpayer actions is a description of the specific actions to be
so categorized.1 Consequently, one question, which may be asked,
is whether SAARs are necessary and whether a GAAR might be
sufficient to counter abusive transactions.

In this article, the authors provide a broad summary of the
anti-avoidance rules used in the United States that relate to
its bilateral tax treaties. The primary anti-avoidance rules
used by the United States in its domestic legislation are the
thin capitalization rules (earnings stripping), expatriation
tax, transfer pricing, substance-over-form, step transaction,
economic substance, limitation on hybrid entities, anti-conduit
regulations, and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)
rules.2 The anti-avoidance rules included in most of US tax
treaties are beneficial ownership, limitation on benefits (LOB)
and limitation on residents. In this article, the authors also
focus on treaty-based anti-avoidance rules. They then discuss
whether or not a GAAR would be appropriate in the context of US
tax treaties.

2. Limitation on Hybrid Entities3

1.
J.D. Rosenberg Tax Avoidance And Income Measurement, 87 Mich. L. Rev. p. 365 (Nov. 1988).
2.
At the time of the writing of this article, the FATCA rules were not yet in force.
3.
According to the Joint Committee on Taxation Report [JCS-23-97], at p. 251, it was estimated that the
provision would increase federal fiscal year budget receipts by USD 1 million per year in each of the years 1998 to
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In 1997, the US Treasury promulgated regulations under the
section 7701 classification rules of the US Internal Revenue
Code (IRC),4 known as the “check-the-box” regulations. Pursuant
to the regulations, entities, whether domestic or foreign, can
be considered for tax purposes to be partnerships and,
therefore, their income is subject to tax at the hands of their
members or beneficiaries. However, this rule applies only to
entities that are not considered to be “per se corporations”.
Per se corporations are considered to be corporations for tax
purposes and, therefore, taxed as separate entities,
notwithstanding the check-the-box regulations.5 Consequently, any
other entity that is not considered to be per se and wishes to
be taxed as corporation should make an election either by the
entity or its members to be allowed such a tax treatment. The
election is available to any entity, in addition to per se
corporations, even if taxed differently in the home country,
i.e. taxed as a partnership in the United States and as a
separate entity in the other jurisdiction and vice versa. As a
result of the potential of different tax treatment in two
jurisdictions, avoiding taxes in multiple tax jurisdictions
became easily accessible. The US Congress, therefore, became
2007. It is beyond the scoop of this article to argue whether this estimate was correct and especially, if correct,
whether it was justify to introduce section 894 and its regulations.
4.
IRC Regs. 301.7701-2 to 301.7701-3.
5.
The list of per se corporations is contained in IRC Regs. 301.7701-2(b).
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concerned as to the potential tax-avoidance opportunities
available for foreign investors in the United States through
dual tax classification entities (hybrid entities):6
[PCD single spaced]
In particular, the Congress understood that the interaction
of the tax laws and the applicable tax treaty could provide
a business structuring opportunity that would allow
Canadian corporations with U.S. subsidiaries to avoid both
U.S. and Canadian income taxes with respect to those U.S.
operations.

Pursuant to these concerns,7 in 1997, the Congress enacted
section 894(c) to deny the limited withholding tax rates,
provided by tax treaties with regard to any item of income that
is subject to tax in the United States. The denial of the
benefits is imposed when the income is derived through an entity
that, under US tax law, is treated as a hybrid entity, provided
that the income is not considered: (1) to be derived and taxed
by the foreign person under the tax laws of the treaty state;
(2) the tax treaty does not contain a provision on its
application in respect of an item of income derived through a

6.
Joint Committee on Taxation Report [JCS-23-97], at p. 249. See also HR Rep. No. 148, 105th Cong., 1st
Sess. 550 (1997. For the structure described by the Committee, see [Initials] Klein & [Initials] Renfroe, Section
894: Payments to Flow-Through Entities, 26 Tax Mgt. Intl. J. P. 547 (1997).
7.
HR Rep. No. 148, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 550 (1997).
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partnership;8 and (3) the treaty state does not impose tax on a
distribution of such income from such an entity to such a
person.9

In 2002, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the US
Treasury finalized and introduced Reg. 1.894-1(d), which is a
special rule for items of income received by entities in attempt
to provide additional taxpayer certainty in complex settings
regarding the consequences of partnership or corporate status
and the availability of treaty benefits. The regulations apply
in respect of all income tax treaties to which the United States
is a party with the exception of when the United States and the
other treaty partner “otherwise explicitly agreed upon” either
in the treaty text or by a mutual agreement procedure (MAP)
taken by the competent authorities of the two countries.10 An
entity is eligible to the reduced withholding tax rate in a
relevant tax treaty only to the extent that the income is
derived by a resident11 of the treaty partner jurisdiction, and
taxed accordingly.12

8.
See US Model Income Tax Convention art. 1(6) (15 Nov. 2006), Models IBFD regarding transparent
entities.
9.
See HR Rep. No. 148, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 550 (1997) (a foreign country is “considered to impose tax on
a distribution even though such tax may be reduced or eliminated by … deductions or credits otherwise available to
the taxpayer”). See also B.B. Bittker & L. L. Lokken: Federal Taxation of Income, Estates, and Gifts para. 67.3.
Treaty Limitations and Antiabuse Rules (WG&L 20092009).
10.
Reg. Sec. 1.894-1(d)(4).
11.
Under Reg. Sec. 1.894-1(d)(3)(v) a person is a determined as resident of a treaty jurisdiction according to
the rules of the tax treaty.
12.
Reg. Sec. 1.894-1(d)(1).
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3. Beneficial Ownership

The beneficial owner requirement is a SAAR found in most US tax
treaties and also in the OECD Model (2010)13 and the UN Model
(2001).14 In general, the beneficial ownership requirement is
situated in articles 10, 11 and 12 of tax treaties, dealing with
dividends, interest and income from royalties, respectively.15
Some countries also add the beneficial ownership requirement to
article 13 dealing with capital gains.16

Article 10(1) provides that income from dividends may be taxed
in the state where the recipient is a resident. Articles 11(1)
and 12(1) provide that an income from interest and royalties may
be taxed only in the state where the recipient is a resident.
However, article 10(2) allows the state of source to impose
withholding tax on such income in accordance to the source
state’s domestic laws. In addition, the article limits the
source state to imposing withholding tax at a rate that is
usually lower or equal to that provided for by domestic law (0%
to 15%). The residence state’s sole taxing right and the reduced
13.
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (22 July 2010), Models IBFD.
14.
UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Jan. 2001), Models IBFD.
15.
Reference to articles in this section are to the articles of the US Model (2006).
16.
See, for example, Agreement Between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the
Republic of Singapore for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to
Taxes on Income art. 13(5) (19 May 2005), Treaties IBFD.
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tax rate granted to the source state only applies when the
beneficial owner of the income is a resident of the other
contracting state.17 Otherwise, the source state may impose tax
in accordance to its domestic law. In the United States,
according to sections 1441-1443 of the IRC, income from
dividends, interest and royalties (FDAP) sourced in the United
States is subject to a 30% withholding tax.

The reduced (or no) tax rate imposed by the source state applies
only when the beneficial owner is a resident of the other
contracting state. Accordingly, in situations where the
recipient is not the beneficial owner, the treaty rate is
allowed if it can be demonstrated that the beneficial owner is a
resident of the treaty state, even if not the recipient. For
instance, if a US-based company pays dividend to a resident of
the United Kingdom, to withhold taxes under the United KingdomUnited States Income Tax Treaty (2001),18 the beneficial owner
must be UK resident.

17.
It should be noted that, in OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1995), the OECD
amended OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (11 Apr. 1977), Models IBFD by replacing the
words “if the recipient is the beneficial owner of the dividends” with “if the beneficial owner of the dividends is a
resident of the other Contracting State”. However, in the US Model Income Tax Convention (20 Sept. 1996), Models
IBFD and US Model (2006) the wording is “… if the dividends are beneficially owned by a resident of the other
Contracting State”. Accordingly, the demand that the income is received by the beneficial owner, as was the case in
the OECD Model before 1995, was not included in the US Model and was subsequently also omitted from the
OECD Model.
18.
Convention Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the United States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains (24 July 2001), Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: U.K.U.S. Income Tax Treaty].
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The term “beneficial owner” is defined neither in tax treaties
nor in the various models. This fact, together with the
different interpretations given to the term by different
countries and courts, increases uncertainty and costly
litigation between tax authorities and taxpayers.19 In addition,
even more complications are associated with the fact that the
concept of beneficial ownership or beneficial owner is not
recognized in the civil law countries that are members of the
OECD,20 which raise the possibility that disagreement might arise
between countries that might be unappeasable, even through a
MAP. In one decision,21 a court in Canada held that a holding
company is considered to be the beneficial owner with regard to
Canada–Netherlands Income Tax Treaty (1986).22 That decision was
given by the court, despite the fact that the holding company
had minor activities and assets, and received and distributed
dividends almost simultaneously. The court had a long debate as
to how to define the term “beneficial” owner when the source
state was a civil law country and the recipient state was in a
common law country.
19.
For a broader explanation and concern as to multilateral disagreement, see P. Baker, Beneficial Ownership:
After Indofood, 6 GITC Rev. 1 (Feb. 2007).
20.
CA: TC, 22 Apr. 2008, Prévost Car Inc. v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2004-2006(IT)G and 2004-4226(IT)G,
Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD.
21.
Id.
22.
Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Canada for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (27 May 1986) (as amended through 1997),
Treaties IBFD.
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4. Limitation on Benefits

States regard a tax treaty as a vehicle to provide treaty
benefits to residents of the contracting states, the parties to
the agreement, as achieved by their treaty delegation. The
question that is, therefore, raised in respect of this approach
is who is entitled to be treated as a resident of a contracting
state and so to enjoy treaty benefits.

Although the text of the OECD Model does not have express antiabuse provisions, the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model
(2010)23 contains an extensive discussion approving the use of
such provisions in tax treaties to limit the ability of third
country residents to obtain treaty benefits.

The United States’ position is that tax treaties should include
specific, broad and detailed provisions to prevent misuse of tax
treaties by residents of third countries. Consequently, the US
Model (1981),24 as amended in 1996 and again in 2006, includes
LOB provisions and, therefore, most US tax treaties contain
comprehensive LOB provisions that include some changes comparing

23.
IBFD.
24.

OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on Article 1 (22 July 2010), Models
US Model Income Tax Convention (16 June 1996), Models IBFD.

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art45

10

Avi-Yonah and Halabi:

11
to the US Model (2006).25 In general, a tax treaty that provides
benefits to a resident of a contracting state permits the use of
the tax treaty by residents of third countries to obtain the
benefits of a tax treaty between the two contracting states by
way of a legal entity formed in one of the two contracting
state, i.e. treaty shopping.

It should be noted that not every case of a third country
resident establishing legal entity in other state is considered
to be treaty shopping. If there are substantial reasons for
establishing the structure that were unrelated to obtaining
treaty benefits, the structure does not fall within the
definition of “treaty shopping”.

Article 22 and the anti-abuse provisions of domestic law
complement each other, as article 22 effectively determines
whether an entity has a sufficient nexus to the contracting
state to be treated as a resident for treaty purposes, while the
domestic anti-abuse provisions, for example, the business
purpose, substance-over-form, step transaction or conduit
principles, determine whether a particular transaction should be
recast in accordance with its substance. Accordingly, the

25.
The US tax treaties with Greece, Hungary, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland and Romania do not contain LOB
provisions.
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internal law principles of the source state may be applied to
identify the beneficial owner of an item of income and article
22 is then applied to the beneficial owner to determine if that
person is entitled to the benefits of the tax treaty with regard
to the income.26

The LOB article of the US Model (2006) reflects significant
changes to the LOB article of the US Model (1996). These changes
are intended to make it more difficult for third country
residents to benefit inappropriately from a tax treaty. When a
resident of one state derives income from another, the domestic
tax laws of the two countries may cause that income to be taxed
in both countries, either because of source: resident taxation
or because of source:source taxation. Consequently, one purpose
of a tax treaty is to prevent the double taxation of residents
of the treaty states by allocating taxing rights in respect of
cross-border transactions. As noted previously, although a tax
treaty is intended to apply only to residents of the two treaty
states, residents of a third country may attempt to benefit from
a tax treaty by engaging in tax favourable structuring.

From the early 1980s, the United States, when signing tax
treaties, has insisted on including an LOB denying treaty
26.

US Model Income Tax Convention Technical Explanation (15 Nov. 2006), Models IBFD.
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benefits if a person to whom treaty benefits should be granted
is not the taxpayer resident in one of the states.

The US Model (1980) contained an LOB provision, in article 16,
that denied treaty benefits to an entity that was resident in
one of the contracting states unless more than 75% of the
beneficial interest in the entity were owned by individuals
resident of the same state and no substantial part of its income
was paid out from the entity as interest, royalties or other
deductible payments to residents of a third country. That double
test encompassed the ownership and the base erosion tests to the
effect that an entity established in a foreign state was owned
by residents of that state so as to eliminate the use of such an
entity. This was because, in paying all its income to a third
country, the base erosion test requires that a substantial part
of its profits remain in that country. Article 16 also denied
treaty benefits if the income was subject, in the residence
state, to lower tax than that which would apply to similar
income arising in that state that was derived by resident of the
other state.

These strict rules were an obstacle to bona-fide structures
forming a real business due to the ownership test, as they
demanded a high ownership threshold. Beginning with the protocol
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to the Italy-United States Income Tax Treaty (1984),27 a 50%
ownership threshold was introduced as opposed to the previous
75% threshold in respect of the ownership and base erosion
tests.28 The new threshold was included in tax treaties
negotiated and signed in the 1990s.29

The US Model (1996) substantially refined the LOB article and
tax treaties signed few years latter reflected the provisions
contained in that Model. The US Model (2006) changed the LOB
article yet again. This has found expression in the recent tax
treaty negotiated and signed by the United States.

The LOB articles included in recent tax treaties and protocols
are generally similar to each other as well as to the US Model
(2006). Nonetheless, there are some differences. Specifically,
the public trading test, the derivative benefits rules30 and the
foreclosure eligibility in respect of treaties benefit certain
triangular arrangements.31 The US Model (2006) does not, however,

27.
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Italian
Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income and the Prevention of Fraud or
Fiscal Evasion (17 Apr. 1984), Treaties IBFD.
28.
For instance, Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Republic of Indonesia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect
to Taxes on Income art. 28(6)-(8) (1 July 1988), Treaties IBFD.
29.
Bittker & Lokken, supra n. 9.
30.
This is intended to grant treaty benefits to a treaty state resident if the resident’s owners would have been
entitled to the same benefits had the income flowed directly to them.
31.
An arrangement whereby income, such as interest, is lightly taxed because it is derived by a third country
PE of a treaty state resident.
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include special derivative benefits rules or rules for
triangular arrangements.

Article 22 of the US Model (2006) contains a list of persons who
are entitled to the benefits of the tax treaty and refers to
them as “qualified persons”. Persons who do not fall within the
definition of a qualified person may, nevertheless, be entitled
to the benefits of a tax treaty under certain conditions as is
explained below.

Article 22(1) of the US Model (2006) grants treaty benefits to
individual resident of a treaty state. However, if the
individual is used as a device to obtain treaty benefits for a
resident of a third country and is, therefore, not considered to
be the beneficial owner in respect of the income, the benefits
are denied.32 Under article 22(1) and (3), an entity resident in
a treaty state is entitled to treaty benefits only if it falls
within one of the following categories.

The article treats some persons as qualified persons and,
therefore, as entitled to treaty benefits with no restrictions,
but other persons are only treated as such subject to
limitations. The US Model (2006) allows treaty benefits to
32.

US Model (2006), Technical Explanation regarding the term “beneficial ownership”.
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governments, political subdivisions and local authorities of a
contracting state. This provision is narrower than the
corresponding provision of the US Model (1996), which allowed
treaty benefits to any qualified governmental entity, including
entities owned by the treaty state, governmental pension funds
and the governing body of the contracting state.33

5. Recent Developments34

5.1. Introductory remarks

The tax treaties and protocols signed by the United States in
recent years have changed compared to the US Model (2006)
following the introduction of a new article that reflects the
anti-treaty-shopping provisions.

The traditional LOB provision in the US Model (2006) applies
only if the principal class of a company’s shares is primarily
traded on a recognized stock exchange located in the company’s
residence state. However, for example, the public trading tests

33.
See art. 22(2)(b) US Model (1996).
34.
Joint Committee on Taxation, Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on the Proposed Tax Protocols with Sweden and France and the
Proposed Tax Treaty with Bangladesh (JCX- 08-06) (2 Feb. 2006).
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in the Belgium-United States Income (2006),35 Denmark-United
States Income (1999)36 and Finland-United States Income and
Capital (1898)37 Tax Treaties may be satisfied by trading on a
stock exchange located in a company’s residence state in other
jurisdictions that are considered to be part of the economic
area that includes the relevant treaty state. Such tax treaties
include the derivative benefits rules that are intended to grant
treaty benefits to a treaty state resident if the resident’s
owners would have been entitled to the same benefits had the
income flowed directly to them.

5.2. Triangular arrangements

Despite the absence of a triangular arrangements provision in
the US Model (2006), the Belgium-United States Income (2006),
Denmark-United States Income (1999) and Finland-United States
Income and Capital (1898) Tax Treaties include rules that are
intended to prevent eligibility for treaty benefits arising in
respect of certain triangular arrangements. Such arrangements
include where interest on a loan is lightly taxed, as it is
35.
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom
of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on
Income (27 Nov. 2006), Treaties IBFD.
36.
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom
of Denmark for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on
Income (19 Aug. 1999) (as amended through 2006), Treaties IBFD.
37.
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic
of Finland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on
Income and on Capital (21 Sept. 1989) (as amended through 2006), Treaties IBFD.
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derived by a third-country permanent establishment (PE) of a
treaty state resident.

This provision is likely to appear on tax treaties with
countries that use the exemption method to eliminate double
taxation, rather than the credit method. Some countries, for
example, Belgium, Denmark and Germany, have moved towards a
territorial tax system, which, in general, taxes income
generated within the country. In such countries, the income of a
resident company derived through a PE located in a treaty state
is exempt from tax in the residence state.

The Belgium-United States Income Tax Treaty (2006) includes
rules that are intended to allow treaty benefits for certain
treaty state residents functioning as headquarters companies.
Although the US Model (2006) does not include special
limitation-on-benefits rules for headquarters companies, similar
rules have been included in the Australia-United States (1982)38
and the Netherlands-United States (1992)39 Income Tax Treaties.
The 2006 protocol to the Denmark-United States Income Tax Treaty
(1999) includes rules that are intended to allow treaty benefits
38.
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Australia for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (6 Aug.
1982), Treaties IBFD
39.
Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (18 Dec. 1992), Treaties
IBFD.
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to certain Danish taxable non-stock corporations and Danish
companies owned by taxable non-stock corporations. Taxable nonstock corporations are entities designed to preserve control of
certain Danish operating companies through control of the
companies’ voting stock. The 2006 protocol to the Germany-United
States Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1989)40 includes special
rules for determining whether or not certain German investment
vehicles are entitled to treaty benefits. Under article 1(1) of
the US Model (2006), as well as article 1 of the OECD Model
(2010), a foreign person is entitled to treaty benefits in
respect of the relevant tax treaty only if the person is a
resident of the foreign state with which the United States has
concluded the tax treaty.

The 2005 protocol to the Sweden-United States Income Tax Treaty
(1994)41 applies to triangular branch structures in respect of
certain types of US income earned. Under the rule, some payments
of interest, royalties and insurance premiums paid by a US payor
to a PE of a Swedish resident in a third country may be subject
to US withholding tax if Sweden does not tax the income and the
third country only taxes it lightly. However, the 2005 protocol
40.
Convention Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to
Certain Other Taxes (29 Aug. 1989) (as amended through 2006), Treaties IBFD.
41.
Convention Between the Government of Sweden and the Government of the United States of America for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (1. Sept.
1994) (as amended through 2005), Treaties IBFD.
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limits the US withholding tax to 15% in respect of interest and
royalties, rather than applying the 30% withholding under US
domestic law.

5.3. Recognized stock exchanges

Most LOB articles provide that a company that is a resident of a
treaty state qualifies for treaty benefits, without regard to
whether or not any other tests are satisfied, if there is
substantial and regular trading of its principal class of stock
on an approved stock exchange located in one of the two treaty
states. Recognized stock exchanges typically include the NASDAQ
and/or any US exchange established under the Securities Exchange
Act (1934), one or more exchanges in the other contracting
state, and other exchanges as may be agreed by the competent
authorities.

Under the France-United States Income and Capital Tax Treaty
(1994),42 recognized stock exchanges include the following: (1)
the NASDAQ and any stock exchange registered with the US
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a national
securities exchange for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act

42.
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French
Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on
Income and Capital (31 Aug. 1994), Treaties IBFD.
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(1934); (2) the French stock exchanges controlled by the
Commission des operations de bourse; and (3) the exchanges of
Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt, Hamburg, London, Madrid, Milan,
Sydney, Tokyo and Toronto, and any other stock exchanges as may
be agree by the competent authorities.

Under the Netherlands-United States Income Tax Treaty (1992),
recognized stock exchanges include any stock exchange registered
with the SEC, the NASDAQ, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange or the
parallel market of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, except with
regard to closely held companies, and any other exchange as may
be agreed by the competent authorities. The competent
authorities have expanded this list to include the exchanges in
Brussels, Frankfurt, Hamburg, London, Madrid, Milan, Paris,
Sydney, Tokyo and Toronto. The Hungary-United States (2010),43
Iceland-United States (2007)44 and United Kingdom-United States
(2001) Income Tax Treaties have expanded the stock exchanges
covered by the definition of recognized stock exchanges to
include not only the stock exchanges in the treaty partner’s
country, but also a list of other stock exchanges, usually from
an EU Member States, but also from other countries with
43.
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic
of Hungary for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on
Income(4 Feb. 2010), Treaties IBFD.
44.
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iceland for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (23 Oct.
2007), Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: Ice.-U.S. Income Tax Treaty].
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attractive and active stock markets, such as Johannesburg,45
Sydney, Tokyo and Toronto.46

The publicly traded company test in the 2005 protocol to the
Sweden-United States Income Tax Treaty (1994) includes general
requirements, referred to as the “substantial presence” test,
and defines a recognized stock exchange in respect of a company
resident in the United States as a recognized stock exchange
located in a third country that is a party to the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or, in respect of a company
resident in Sweden, as a recognized stock exchange located in
the European Economic Area (EEA), the European Union or
Switzerland.

5.4. Derivative benefits

Prior to the Netherlands-United States Income Tax Treaty (1992),
the Jamaica-United States Income Tax Treaty (1980)47 was the only
occasion on which the United States had agreed to a “derivative

45.
U.K.-U.S. Income Tax Treaty.
46.
Ice.-U.S. Income Tax Treaty and U.K.-U.S. Income Tax Treaty.
47.
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Jamaica for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (21 May
1980), Treaties IBFD.
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benefits”48 provision. In addition, only this tax treaty and the
1995 protocol to the Canada-United States Income Tax Treaty
(1980)49 apply the derivative benefits concept fully, without
restriction to a particular group of countries.50

The absence of the derivative benefit resulted in a situation
that a resident of a third state, which has a tax treaty with
the United States that is in accordance to the US Model (2006),
is not entitled to treaty benefits if investing or deriving
income in the United States via an entity resident in another
country that has a similar tax treaty with the United States,
assuming that both states signed the same tax treaty with the
United States that is consistent with the US Model. Such a
disadvantage has no rationale. The reason for limiting the use
of a tax treaty by way of an LOB provision is in respect of a
resident of a non-treaty state investing in the United States
through a treaty state. This is a rationale that can be
accepted. Accordingly, the derivative benefits test was
introduced to mitigate this abnormality in the LOB provision in
the US Model. This change in the US perspective in relation to

48.
A corporation resident in Jamaica and owned by a US corporation is entitled to treaty benefits, provided
that it is held by an individual resident in third country and that individual would have been entitled to the benefits in
an applicable tax treaty between the third country and the United States.
49.
Convention Between Canada and the United States of America with respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital (26 Sept. 1980) (as amended through 1995), Treaties IBFD.
50.
R.E. Anderson, Analysis of United States Income Tax Treaties current through 2011, (RIA Thompson
2011).
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the LOB provision is a matter of policy, as it has already been
decided that the residents of third countries should qualify for
this benefit and that, prima facie, the residents of the third
countries are not treaty shopping by way of another [correct?]
contracting state, as the same benefits are available in the
home state.

The derivative benefit provisions in recent tax treaties, for
example, in the United Kingdom-United States Income Tax Treaty
(2001), provide that, if a resident company of one state that
receives income from the United States is substantially owned by
residents of a third country and that third country has a tax
treaty with the United States that provides for the same
benefits in respect of that income as in the tax treaty, there
should be no objection to such third country residents obtaining
that benefit indirectly via the tax treaty, as opposed to
directly under the third country treaty with the United States.

5.5. Equivalent beneficiaries

An “equivalent beneficiary” is another extension of the US LOB
article and can usually be found in the recent tax treaties
signed by the United States with EU Member States. The
definition of the term includes not only a resident of one of
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the contracting states, but also a resident of an EU or EEA
Member State, but where there is a tax treaty between the EU or
EEA Member State and the United States and would, under the tax
treaty, be considered to be a “qualified person”.

The need for an extension from a beneficiary to an equivalent
beneficiary is in line with the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (2007),51 which prohibits discrimination in
respect of establishment. In this regard, it should be noted
that the rationale behind the concept of the freedom of
establishment is, in general, to treat all the EU Member States
as one.

5.6. Limitation on residents

Under most US tax treaties, and as provided for by the OECD and
UN Models, the provisions of a tax treaty are limited to
residents of one of the contracting states. One of the reasons
for this explicit requirement is to avoid that misuse of a
bilateral tax treaty by a person who is a not a resident of
either of the contracting states. In this respect, article 4 of
the OECD, UN and US Models provides that a resident of a

51.

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2007) OJ C 115 (2008), EU Law IBFD.
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contracting state is a person who under the laws of the home
country is considered to be a resident.

Although the definition of a resident as provided by article
4(1) refers to the concept of residence as adopted in the
domestic laws, the article indicates that the criteria to be
considered in defining the term resident are those to the extent
to which the term is based on the person’s domicile, residence,
place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature.

The fact that a person is determined to be a resident of a
contracting state under the laws of that state does not
necessarily entitle that person to the benefits of a tax treaty.
In addition to being a resident under the domestic law, the term
resident must also be in line with the criteria contained in
article 4 of the tax treaty to be treated as resident for the
application of the tax treaty and, therefore, to receive the
benefits granted to the residents of a contracting state.

Accordingly, although the definition of a resident to whom a tax
treaty might apply is borrowed from and relies on the domestic
legislation of each of the contracting states, the various
models ensure that the residence of a taxpayer is material and
not technical, by providing for an exception to the rule in
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stating that the term “resident” does not include any person who
is liable to tax in that contracting state only in respect of
income from sources in that state or capital situated therein.52
Excluding persons who are subject to tax only on a territorial
basis is intended to ensure that treaty benefits are only
granted where the income derived abroad is taxed in the person’s
residence state.53

Tax treaties are not usually concerned with the domestic laws of
the contracting states, or how the laws are structure or
defined.54 This is, however, not true with regard to the
definition of a resident. A tax treaty sets out the conditions
under which a person is to be treated as fiscally resident and
also includes a condition that that person is fully liable to
tax in that state.

A tax treaty excludes from the definition of a resident a person
who is not “liable to tax” in a contracting state under its
laws. Consequently, tax treaties include an anti-avoidance rule
to eliminate the potential double non-taxation when a person is

52.
Art 4(1).
53.
For a thorough explanation of the exclusion under art. 4(1), see OECD Model: Commentary on Article 4
(2010).
54.
See art. 3(2) of the OECD, UN and US Models, which provides, without exception, that “any term not
defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of
that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws
of that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that State”.
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not liable to tax in the residence state and the source state
does not tax the relevant income due to the application of a tax
treaty, for example, article 11, which provides for a sole
taxing right in respect of the residence state.

As the “liable to tax” condition has, in recent years, raised
many questions regarding entities that are tax exempt in their
residence state as to whether or not they are considered to be
“liable to tax”, countries have expressed their concerns and the
OECD has responded. In this respect, the OECD has stated in
paragraphs 8.6 to the Commentary on Article 4 (2010), that tax
exempted entities, for example, pension funds:
[PCD single spaced]
may be exempted from tax, but they are exempt only if they
meet all of the requirements for exemption specified in the
tax laws. They are, thus, subject to the tax laws of a
Contracting State.55 Furthermore, if they do not meet the
standards specified, they are also required to pay tax.

6. Conclusions: A GAAR for US Tax Treaties?

55.
See also the thorough discussion on the implications of “liability to tax” in OECD, The Granting of Treaty
Benefits with respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles (2010) [correct?], International
Organizations’ Documentation IBFD, inserted into paras. 6.9-6.34 of the OECD Model: Commentary of Article 1
(2010), especially paras. 6.11-6.16.
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As this article indicates, US tax treaties are subject to
numerous SAARs. However, the question still remains as to
whether or not a GAAR would be appropriate in this context.

The problem with US SAARs is that they tend to be very
complicated and technical. A comparison of the LOB article in US
tax treaties with that in the US Model (2006) suggests that
actual LOBs have loopholes, introduced during the treaty
negotiations, that can be exploited. Other SAARs, such as the
anti-hybrid rule, are very narrow in scope.

The advantage of a GAAR is that is it by definition much broader
and less subject to avoidance. The disadvantage is that a GAAR
may deter legitimate transactions. However, the evidence from
other countries that have GAARs suggests that with appropriate
safeguards a GAAR is not a significant disincentive in respect
of legitimate transactions, but, rather, that it restricts
abusive tax planning. India and the United Kingdom are two
countries that are currently contemplating adopting a GAAR for
this reason.

The United States is unlikely to enact a GAAR any time soon. The
enactment of the economic substance doctrine in 2010 may have an
important effect on tax treaties. Before then, it was unclear as
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to whether or not the IRS had the authority to promulgate SAARs
in a treaty context, such as conduit regulations, that could
override tax treaties. Now, however, the IRS can argue that the
conduit regulations are an application of economic substance, as
conduits are likely to lack a bone fide business purpose. It
may, therefore, be that, in the treaty context, the conduit
regulations will now act essentially as a GAAR and apply to
situations that are not caught by the SAARs described previously
in this article.
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